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† 
ABSTRACT 
This Essay examines the continuing significance of the Keyes deci-
sion to the judicial vision of equality and racial isolation in public educa-
tion. By comparing efforts to promote educational equality from the 
Keyes era through today, this Essay asserts that the judiciary has wrongly 
embraced a colorblind interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. In 
so doing, courts have impeded the progress of children in Denver and 
around the country, ignored highly instructive social science studies on 
the benefits of desegregation, and broken the constitutional promise of 
equal citizenship. For future policy makers and lawyers to address these 
persistent problems, legal educators must equip students with tools to 
reclaim legal conversations about freedom and equality. The author, 
Dean Phoebe A. Haddon of the University of Maryland Francis King 
Carey School of Law, concludes with recollections of her late aunt, Ra-
chel B. Noel, who played an instrumental part in the evolution of the 
Keyes case.  
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INTRODUCTION
 
It is a pleasure to join this symposium, which includes so many old 
friends as well as new colleagues gathered to explore the continuing sig-
nificance of Keyes v. School District No. 1.
1
 During the first panel last 
evening,
2
 men and women shared stories of their own diverse experienc-
es and those of their families in the days leading up to and following the 
decision to litigate Keyes. These accounts were deeply moving, and they 
set the stage for our exploration forty years later. Both the constitutional 
jurisprudence about equality as well as the tools for relief that are availa-
ble to courts have changed dramatically in the past forty years. 
Although I knew firsthand some of the stories that were shared last 
evening from my interviews with my aunt, Rachel Noel, and her dear 
friend and ally, Ed Benton, I learned from the panelists that the actors not 
only were intent on keeping the promise of Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion
3
 but also were motivated by their dedication to the memory and 
work of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. It was news of his senseless slaying 
that galvanized integration advocates and led them to formulate the Noel 
desegregation resolution that eventually brought about the Keyes suit.
4
 
This kind of rededication to deliver on Brown’s promise—to address 
continuing racial disparities in access to education and opportunities to 
learn—is necessary today. Colorblind doctrine5 has made it more diffi-
  
 1. 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
 2. See Panel 1: Remembering Keyes from Those Who Lived It (Jan. 31, 2013), 
http://mediaserv.law.du.edu/flashvideo/specialevents/2013-Law-Review-Symposium/2013-Law-
Review-Symposium.htm (presenting a retrospective roundtable on Keyes by those who experienced, 
lived, and litigated the case in the Denver metropolitan area). 
 3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 4. Craig Barnes, A Personal Memoir of Plaintiffs’ Co-counsel in Keyes v. School District 
No. 1, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 1059, 1061–64 (2013). 
 5. “Colorblind doctrine” refers to the intent-based application of strict scrutiny to all express 
uses of race. See Ian Haney-López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779, 1826 (2012). See 
generally id. at 1826–28 (charting the emergence of colorblind doctrine from Justice Powell’s color-
blind logic in Bakke to its dominance in the Court following Croson). For an explanation of the 
implications of colorblind doctrine on broader society, see STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE 
REVEALED: HOW INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA 170 (1996) (explaining that the 
colorblind doctrine is a manifestation of legal liberalism that says race plays no part in society, 
resulting in the continuation of an “invisible system of white privilege”). For an incisive and seminal 
challenge to this notion that the Constitution compels colorblind doctrine, see Neil Gotanda, A 
Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 passim (1991). For a challenge to 
the application of colorblindness as a governing principle in the context of mass incarceration, see 
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 227–31 (2010). For more on efforts to integrate schools, see Margalynne J. Arm-
strong & Stephanie Wildman, Teaching Race/Teaching Whiteness: Transforming Colorblindness to 
Color Insight, 86 N.C. L. REV. 635 (2008). 
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cult to deliver on that promise, but I believe at this symposium, we can 
lay the framework for the future. 
The promise of Brown to which I refer was reiterated in a dissent by 
Justice Marshall in Milliken v. Bradley,
6
 another Supreme Court case 
decided around the time of Keyes. Justice Marshall challenged the Court 
majority’s rejection of a cross-district remedy for segregation found to 
exist in Detroit, Michigan.
7
 White flight into the suburbs and official 
conduct of the city and neighboring communities had left the city racially 
isolated, but the Court majority denied the remedy that could have ad-
dressed racial imbalance in the schools.
8
 Justice Marshall observed in 
dissent that primary and secondary schools are foundational not only in 
providing educational opportunities for the children but also in shaping 
their identity formation, openness to living in a community, and ability to 
get along with others.
9
 In his view, an appropriate remedy could take 
account of the vital role of public schools to impart those civic and other 
important values we carry with us to the end of our days.
10
 He said, 
“[U]nless our children begin to learn together, there is little hope that our 
people will ever learn to live together.”11  
This vision of public education and support for broad judicial power 
has been diminished, perhaps most dramatically in San Antonio Inde-
pendent School District v. Rodriguez.
12
 There, the Court refused to find a 
constitutional right to education and solidified the states and local gov-
ernment as principal decision makers responsible for funding policies.
13
 
With the Rodriguez Court’s deference to political resolution of the ques-
tion of equality in public education, federal courts were disabled from 
redressing equality claims.  
The disparity of resources in school districts has widened
14
 even as 
racial isolation of public schools has increased.
15
 Yet the Brown prophe-
sy about the importance of learning and getting along is more accurate 
today than ever before, even though it is not often linked to judicial con-
ceptions of equality and respect.
16
 The Kerner report’s warning of two 
nations divided by race and wealth is hard to challenge.
17
 A root of the 
  
 6. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
 7. Id. at 782–83 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 8. Id. at 782. 
 9. Id. at 783. 
 10. Id. at 807. 
 11. Id. at 783. 
 12. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 13. Id. at 37. 
 14. For statistics on disparities of school resources, see Civil Rights Data Collection, U.S. 
DEP’T EDUC., http://ocrdata.ed.gov (last visited Apr. 16, 2013). 
 15. See GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HISTORIC REVERSALS, 
ACCELERATING RESEGRETATION, AND THE NEED FOR NEW INTEGRATION STRATEGIES 3 (2007). 
 16. David L. Kirp, Op-Ed., Making Schools Work, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2012, at SR1. 
 17. See SUMMARY OF REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL 
DISORDERS 1 (1968). 
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problem lies in unaddressed educational disparities. Generations of pub-
lic schoolchildren trapped in poverty have been denied the promise of 
Brown
18
 in urban and rural communities across the country and where 
Jim Crow was never formalized in law. For many black and brown chil-
dren caught in neighborhoods of poverty and often a cycle of violence, 
their very survival is at stake.
19
  
In The New Jim Crow, Michelle Alexander makes a compelling ar-
gument that public policies have supported mass incarceration rather 
than other alternatives for addressing the complex social problem of 
drugs in these poor communities.
20
 Moreover, such policies mask this 
choice to criminalize conduct with colorblind rhetoric.
21
 This shortsight-
ed approach in neighborhoods compromised by drugs, lack of quality 
education, and scarcity of jobs reinforces stereotypes about the “other” 
by limiting corrective options to address disparities.
22
 It also has robbed 
our country of the prosperity and competitive strength of thousands of 
overwhelmingly black and brown youth despite the long-recognized ne-
cessity for state and federal courts alike to intervene when local and na-
tional political processes fail the constitutional guarantee of equal protec-
tion.
23
  
I. THE KEYES CASE 
Soon after Martin Luther King Jr.’s death, the Denver Public 
Schools (DPS) adopted the Noel Resolution, a vehicle used by the school 
board and other leaders to charge Denver Public Schools’ superintendent, 
Robert Gilberts, to implement an integration plan.
24
 Despite evidence 
that district officials were aware of disparities in education and had 
themselves undertaken actions that led to racial isolation of student and 
teacher school assignments, DPS had not responded with a plan.
25
 The 
resolution mandated busing and other measures to address the unequal 
student performance and tangible evidence of discrimination.
26
 Less than 
a year after the Noel Resolution passed, Denver voters, however, defeat-
  
 18. Bob Herbert, Op-Ed., Separate and Unequal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2011, at A27. 
 19. See Julie A. Phillips, White, Black, and Latino Homicide Rates: Why the Difference?, 48 
SOCIAL PROBLEMS 349, 349 (2002) (asserting that structural characteristics such as living in “poor, 
crime-ridden neighborhoods” contribute to higher numbers of deaths among minorities). 
 20. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 5. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Edward Said famously described “othering” as “the act of emphasizing the perceived 
weakness of marginalized groups as a way of stressing the alleged strength of those in positions of 
power.” EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM 5 (1978). 
 23. Justice Harlan Stone’s discussion of representative defects in the democratic process in 
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), popularized this understanding that 
some groups cannot participate as effectively in the political process as others and that politics 
cannot be trusted with their protection. See Lewis F. Powell, Carolene Products Revisited, 82 
COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 1088–89 (1982). 
 24. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 303 F. Supp. 279, 283 (D. Colo. 1969).  
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 283–84. 
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ed two pro-integration school board members (Edgar Benton and Monte 
Pascoe) and elected two strident anti-busing candidates (Frank South-
worth and James Perrill).
27
 Two months later, in a suit filed by Latino, 
black, and white parents alleging that DPS was maintaining a policy of 
intentional segregation, the district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion 
for preliminary injunction.
28
 
A. Grappling with Questions of Segregative Intent 
On July 31, 1969, Judge William Doyle granted the preliminary in-
junction restoring the integration plans that had been rescinded by the 
newly constituted school board.
29
 He concluded that DPS repealing the 
integration resolutions and replacing them with open enrollment was de 
jure segregation, not merely de facto segregation.
30
 After wending its 
way through the federal appeals courts and challenging the district 
court’s mandate to desegregate,31 on October 12, 1972, the Keyes case 
was argued by the plaintiffs before the Supreme Court,
32
 which rendered 
its decision on June 21, 1973.  
The Keyes Court answered the first impression question of what is 
necessary to prove an equal protection violation where no statute had 
segregated schools but where plaintiffs “prove that the school authorities 
have carried out a systemic program of segregation affecting a substan-
tial portion of the students, schools, teachers, and facilities within the 
schools system.”33 It concluded that proof that a meaningful portion of 
the school system was affected by the intentional segregative decision 
making establishes a prima facie case, creating “a presumption that other 
segregated schooling within the system is not adventitious.”34 The major-
ity indicated that the burden was left to the school system to prove that 
other segregated schools within the system were “not [also] the result of 
intentionally segregative actions.”35 The Court majority did not join Jus-
tice Powell in urging in his concurrence that the Court abandon the de 
jure–de facto segregation distinction and require that all school systems 
  
 27. Id. at 284. 
 28. Id. at 289. 
 29. Id. at 288. 
 30. Id. at 287. 
 31. The original injunctive order was vacated and remanded by the Tenth Circuit on August 7, 
1969 because it was seeking more specificity from the order. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 303 F. Supp. 
289, 289–90 (D. Colo. 1969). Judge William Doyle of the district court added supplemental findings 
and reinstated the preliminary injunction. Id. The case was tried on its merits in February 1970, and 
on March 21, 1970 the Court ordered a permanent injunction and an integration plan as a remedy 
after concluding certain schools were segregated. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 313 F. Supp. 61, 63 (D. 
Colo. 1970). This ruling was affirmed in part and reversed in part by the Tenth Circuit. Keyes v. 
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 445 F.2d 990, 1007 (10th Cir. 1971). 
 32. For a recording of the Keyes oral argument, see Keyes v. School District No. 1, OYEZ 
PROJECT IIT CHI.-KENT C.L., http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1972/1972_71_507 (last visited 
Apr. 16, 2013). 
 33. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 201 (1973). 
 34. Id. at 208. 
 35. Id.  
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end school segregation.
36
 The case was remanded to the district court, 
which held later that year that the school system had in fact operated a 
dual system.
37
  
For more than twenty years, the district court set about trying to 
provide relief and return—or perhaps create for the first time—a unitary 
system of education to Denver’s children.38 This work was against the 
backdrop of an increasingly hostile white population that was set against 
the integration resolution that spawned the litigation, had no appetite for 
busing, and had fled neighborhoods that did integrate.
39
 
B. Confronting the “Tri-ethnic Dilemma” of Appropriate Relief from 
Racial Discrimination and Inequality 
Eight Denver children and their parents—Latinos, whites, and 
blacks—sued the school district for employing a pattern of intentional 
conduct leading to widespread racial discrimination and inequality of 
educational opportunity.
40
 However, the dominant theory of the case 
rested on the claims of black children.
41
 Based on evidence that both 
blacks and Latinos attended schools isolated from whites, the Supreme 
Court concluded, among other things, that black and Latino students 
should be treated as minorities suffering similar inequities, and thus their 
presence in one school could not be considered desegregation.
42
 The 
Keyes Court also made clear that Latinos—like blacks in earlier desegre-
gation cases in the South—were entitled to remedies for intentional sepa-
  
 36. Id. at 223–36 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 37. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 368 F. Supp. 207, 210 (D. Colo. 1973). Part of the evidence of 
the case included the fact-gathering of University of Denver statistician Professor George Bardwell, 
a mathematician, and Dr. Paul Klite, a research physician, who used U.S. Census Bureau data and 
school district boundaries to trace movements of the black population and changes in school bounda-
ries. See Barnes, supra note 4, at 1064. Decisions about where to build college preparatory schools 
as compared to manual training schools, where new schools were built, and where students were 
bussed reflected racial concentrations. Id. It was clear that  
[a]s the black population of north Denver had gradually moved east across the northern 
tier of the city, school boundaries for elementary schools had regularly shifted eastward. 
The effect was that black children who had moved across boundary lines into white dis-
tricts could be recaptured by the new lines and brought back into redrawn black dis-
tricts. . . . These boundary changes were effectively segregating Denver’s schools, and 
the practice had been going on since the 1920s.  
Id. at 1065. 
 38. See Tom I. Romero, II, Foreword: How I Rode the Bus to Become a Professor at the 
University of Denver Sturm College of Law; Reflections on Keyes’s Legacy for the Metropolitan, 
Post-racial, and Multiracial Twenty-first Century, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 1023, 1056–57 (2013). 
 39. See infra text accompanying note 48. See generally TIMOTHY J. MINCHIN & JOHN A. 
SALMOND, AFTER THE DREAM: BLACK AND WHITE SOUTHERNERS SINCE 1965, at 6, 179 (2011) 
(explaining that racial factors arising from busing and desegregation were a significant cause of 
white flight and that progress in the South was eroded in the late 1970s due to white flight, forcing 
federal courts after 1980 to continue to engage with complex issues of racial balancing in schools).  
 40. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 445 F.2d 990, 994 (10th Cir. 1971). 
 41. See Barnes, supra note 4, at 1067 (noting exhibits, graphs, and charts of census and other 
data showing trends over the years for racial attendance at all of Denver’s northeast sector schools 
and flows of population across the northern tier of the city). 
 42. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 195–98. 
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ration from whites, and that desegregation was mandated in the North for 
whole districts, not just for individual schools that could prove segregat-
ed intent.
43
 This was a substantial legal victory for the plaintiffs, but the 
black and Latino communities were not unified around the relief they 
sought. This conflict made visible an issue we continue to grapple with 
as we try to define the goals of achieving equality and to mesh compet-
ing interests of groups in a multiracial and ethnic community.
44
 Thus, the 
Keyes case brought to the forefront the need for political coalition build-
ing—not just for tolerance—if we desire to accord equality and respect 
for diverse group-based objectives.
45
 
Because the trial court in Denver, like others across the country, 
faced the task of dismantling the city’s dual systems of education without 
a clear political mandate supporting this work, its undertaking proved 
exceedingly difficult. Moreover, the groups seeking an end to inequality 
were not of one view about how best to level the playing field—black 
and Latino aspirations and goals for their children dramatically di-
verged.
46
 
Busing had been used in Denver to carry students from one neigh-
borhood to others across the city prior to the desegregation mandate of 
the court. But often this tool was used “flexibly,”47 and most often to 
  
 43. Id. at 200. 
 44. See Rachel Moran, Demography and Distrust: The Latino Challenge to Civil Rights and 
Immigration Policy in the 1990s and Beyond, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 1 passim (1995) (asserting that ten-
sions have resulted due to an increase in racial and ethnic diversity within the U.S. population). 
Some of these competing interests include the black interest in integration and the Latino interest in 
the preservation of their respective languages, histories, and communities. Id. at 2, 4; James J. Fish-
man & Lawrence Strauss, Note, Endless Journey: Integration and the Provision of Equal Educa-
tional Opportunity in Denver’s Public Schools: A Study of Keyes v. School District No. 1, 32 HOW. 
L.J. 627, 634 (1989). 
 45. Fishman & Strauss, supra note 44, at 718 (discussing the inclusion of the Hispanic popu-
lation as an important part of the political process of creating “a more democratic society”). 
 46. Chicanos generally looked to the decision makers to provide their children with opportu-
nities to learn in their own neighborhood, seeking additional Latino teachers and principals to teach 
their children and to support their cultural and language interests. See id. at 634 (asserting that His-
panos opposed integration as a form of cultural hegemony). On the other hand, black community 
leaders and parents, wanting their children to attend quality schools with teachers giving the same 
kind of attention that white children received, sought the elimination of racially isolated schools that 
had resulted in their children being bussed as much as forty-five minutes from north to south Den-
ver, while whites’ resistance to any busing had been acceded to by the district officials. Keyes v. 
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 313 F. Supp. 61, 63, 66 (D. Colo. 1970). There was evidence that the school district 
had moved school boundaries east across the northern tier of the city, tracking black migration as it 
moved across the city and consistently having the effect of returning black children to predominately 
segregated schools while taking them out of white schools. Id. at 65. Furthermore, school district 
records explicitly indicated that there were low expectations for black achievement by white teachers 
and school leaders; black achievement was considered not likely to be more than the eighteenth 
percentile of overall student performance, whereas whites were expected to perform in the seventieth 
or eightieth percentile. Low expectations translated into self-fulfilling poor performance that black 
parents urged could be eliminated through integration and quality schools in all communities. See 
generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (examining how separating students 
based on race leads to feelings of inferiority that derail the educational process). 
 47. See Peter M. Shane, School Desegregation Remedies and the Fair Governance of Schools, 
132 U. PA. L. REV. 1041, 1061 n.60 (1984) (“Under so-called ‘freedom-of-choice’ plans, . . . school 
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bring willing black students who chose to attend better schools outside of 
their racially isolated neighborhoods—or to deliver whites to predomi-
nately white schools. By the time of the district court’s mandate, emo-
tions aroused by the issue of busing were deep, especially among whites. 
A decade ago, Derrick Bell observed that “[b]using arouse[d] such re-
sentment because it deprive[d] white[] . . . parents of their ‘freedom’ to 
choose their children’s schools,” and that courts ultimately acceded to 
these personal preferences of whites in the face of escalating white flight 
that was also aided by local government decision makers.
48
 
In his Keyes concurrence, Justice Powell expressed grave concern 
about school desegregation plans that require extensive transportation 
solely to achieve integration; he, like others, emphasized the value of 
neighborhood schools and the traditional community-based fabric of 
public schools.
49
 Justice Powell predicted that the imposition of busing 
for the sake of integration would hasten the dismantling of neighborhood 
education with parents leaving the public school system for the suburbs 
or private schools. Debate over who is to be transported would also di-
vert attention from the goal of equality. True to this prediction, white 
parents in Denver (like elsewhere) manifested their continued opposition 
to busing and racial balance by leaving the school district.
50
 
Ordered by Judge Doyle, the so-called Cardenas Plan—which in-
cluded bilingual education and an ethnic studies program, and was ruled 
unconstitutional by the Tenth Circuit
51—started a round of plans circu-
lated from 1976 to 1995, until Judge Richard Matsch granted a motion to 
terminate the district court’s jurisdiction and return full governance to the 
school board.
52
 
Given the contentious nature of its work, it is likely that any court 
would seek ways to tailor relief that would eliminate some disparities in 
the quality of schools available to blacks and Latinos but with minimal 
disruption to the rest of the community. Professor Tom Romero has writ-
ten persuasively about the “tri-ethnic dilemma,” offering additional in-
  
boards purported to comply with Brown II simply by permitting those minority students who chose 
to transfer to move from all-black schools to majority-white schools—an option that often led to 
little integration.”). 
 48. DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE 
UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 110 (2004). 
 49. Id. at 108. Recent school closures in Philadelphia, Chicago, and other cities have sparked 
political uproar as children have lost out on public education within their communities, resulting in 
the filing of civil rights complaints with the United States Department of Education. See Monica 
Davey, As Chicago Strikes Goes on, the Mayor Digs in, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2012, at A1; Jon 
Hurdle, Philadelphia Officials Vote to Close 23 Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2013, at A16.  
 50. BELL, supra note 48, at 109.  
 51. The Tenth Circuit found that the lower court exceeded its remedial powers when it adopt-
ed the Cardenas Plan and further explained: “We believe that the district court’s adoption of the 
Cardenas Plan would unjustifiably interfere with such state and local attempts to deal with the myri-
ad economic, social, and philosophical problems connected with the education of minority students.” 
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 521 F.2d 465, 482 (10th Cir. 1975). 
 52. See Fishman & Strauss, supra note 44, at 682–83 (detailing the history of Cardenas Plan).  
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sights on the complex and conflicting starting points for discussing 
equality in this metropolitan community in the West.
53
 
C. Shortcomings of Lifting Mandate once Past Discrimination Is Elimi-
nated “to Extent Practicable” 
In 1995, the district court found that DPS had complied in good 
faith by removing segregation “to the extent practicable” 54—terminology 
that came from Missouri v. Jenkins and that all but admitted that racial 
isolation continued—but that remaining inequality was not the vestige of 
unlawful segregation.
55
 Tracing resegregation to permissible, de facto 
explanations as distinguished from the continuing vestiges of segregative 
intentional bias is nearly impossible and, given our current understanding 
of implicit bias today, not a well-founded basis of distinction. In Denver, 
like many urban cities, much of the isolation was a consequence of popu-
lation growth and neighborhood concentration that could not indisputa-
bly be attributed to the old boundary-drawing practices.
56
 Many Latinos 
in the west of the city, as well as blacks who continued to live in impov-
erished neighborhoods in the east, were not bused after the mandate lift-
ed.
57
 The racial isolation was also due to flight out to the edges and then 
beyond the city lines by middle-class whites who feared race mixing or 
simply did not support the racial integration efforts and mightily resisted 
“forced” busing.58  
There is another complicating factor that I argue reflects the short-
comings of trying to make the de jure and de facto distinction in deter-
mining whether court relief was warranted in the case of Denver: the 
twenty-year desegregation options offered by the federal court to address 
racial isolation and develop an effective plan to unite the public school 
system were hampered by the anti-busing clause of the 1974 Poundstone 
Amendment to the Colorado state constitution.
59
 This amendment effec-
tively precluded a citywide solution to segregation even as it prohibited 
growth by annexation of lands surrounding the city.
60
 The amendment 
not only severely curtailed lasting desegregation of DPS, it stunted the 
growth of the city itself and adversely affected economic development of 
  
 53. See Tom I. Romero, II, The “Tri-ethnic” Dilemma: Race, Equality, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment in the American West, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 817, 818, 855 (2004) (assert-
ing that cases like Keyes pose challenges when “set in the context of the multiracial and multiethnic 
American West”). 
 54. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 101 (1995). 
 55. Keyes v. Cong. of Hispanic Educators, 902 F. Supp. 1274, 1281 (D. Colo. 1995) (holding 
that “vestiges of past discrimination by [the district] had been eliminated to extent practicable”). 
 56. Fishman & Strauss, supra note 44, at 635. 
 57. See CATHERINE L. HORN & MICHAL KURLAENDER, CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, THE END OF 
KEYES—RESEGREGATION TRENDS AND ACHIEVEMENTS IN DENVER PUBLIC SCHOOLS 7 (2006) 
(asserting that when the “School Board voted for a return to neighborhood schools,” that policy sent 
“students to the school nearest their home”). 
 58. Fishman & Strauss, supra note 44, at 657. 
 59. COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 1. 
 60. HORN & KURLAENDER, supra note 57. 
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the suburbs.
61
 Supporters of the Poundstone Amendment were open 
about their resistance to busing and school integration and spoke in terms 
that exposed their bias and support of retrenchment.
62
 The amendment 
remains in effect.  
Similar to what was happening in other desegregation cases in the 
North and West, as well as in the South after 1995, once the district court 
granted the motion to terminate jurisdiction over desegregation of DPS, 
the schools in that district rapidly resegregated.
63
 As the Harvard Civil 
Rights Project has noted, although there were bases for linking im-
provements in skills and other qualitative benefits to integration, conclu-
sions about their lasting nature were difficult given the rapid return to 
substantial racial isolation after the mandate was lifted.
64
 
D. Emerging Political Landscape Suggesting “Mission Accomplished” 
Notably, the district court’s decision to end its supervision was 
based in part on its view that a new day had come to Denver. The court 
pointed to tangible evidence of a change in the political landscape that 
included elected black and Latino leaders in Denver and elsewhere in the 
state.
65
 The court noted the change in racial composition of the political 
decision makers made Denver  
very different from what it was when this lawsuit began. . . . Black 
and Hispanic men and women are in the city council, the school 
board, the state legislature, and other political positions. . . . People of 
color are not bystanders. They are active players in the political, eco-
nomic, social and cultural life of the community.
66
 
There are other explanations for the court’s decision. By this time, feder-
al policy shifts that began in the ’80s (particularly during President 
Reagan’s first Administration) contributed to the ebbing of popular sup-
port for integration policies across the country.
67
 A sense of “mission 
  
 61. Tom I. Romero, II, Our Selma Is Here: The Political and Legal Struggle for Educational 
Equality in Denver, Colorado, and Multiracial Conundrums in American Jurisprudence, 3 SEATTLE 
J. FOR SOC. JUST. 73, 121 (2004). 
 62. See id. at 119 (describing various ways in which Denver parents voiced their opposition to 
integration). 
 63. HORN & KURLAENDER, supra note 57. 
 64. Id. at 23. 
 65. Keyes v. Cong. of Hispanic Educators, 902 F. Supp. 1274, 1307 (D. Colo. 1995). 
 66. Id. 
 67. For example, the Reagan Administration helped repeal funding for training, interventions, 
research initiatives, and other programs designed to improve race relations in schools. Gary Orfield, 
Prologue: Lessons Forgotten, in LESSONS IN INTEGRATION: REALIZING THE PROMISE OF RACIAL 
DIVERSITY IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS 1, 3 (Erica Frankenberg & Gary Orfield eds., 2007). In addition, 
President Reagan agreed to repeal the Gifted and Talented Children’s Education Act of 1978. Omni-
bus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2175, 95 Stat. 357, 809 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396n (2012)). The Gifted and Talented Children’s Education Act had 
provided funding for gifted students that helped to meet the greater need for increased participation 
in gifted programs among black and Latino schoolchildren. The Gifted and Talented Children’s 
Education Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-561, Title IX-A, 92 Stat. 2143, 2292 (codified at 20 U.S.C. 
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accomplished” pervaded. Government retrenchment from ambitious in-
tegration mandates in Denver—as in other districts across the country—
was quick.
68
 In the first years of the Reagan Administration, the Presi-
dent pushed strict limits on the use of busing, and Congress debated 
measures to limit the scope of busing plans in many school districts. In 
addition to courts’ willingness to honor the private choices of whites 
about busing, they manifested a lack of interest in considering housing 
discrimination as relevant to school desegregation. A confluence of these 
factors created “an inescapable cycle of racial separation,”69 denying real 
integration for urban centers like Denver and insulating the suburbs. 
E. Assessing Social Science Evidence of Effects of Desegregation and 
Resegregation 
The Keyes case offered opportunities, though short-lived, for social 
scientists to study the effects of social interaction and diverse learning 
environments experienced by children while the court enforced the de-
segregation mandate. As Professor Lisa Martinez and others pointed out 
at this symposium,
70
 there continues to be promising data about the ef-
fects of integration, but challenges remain relating to poverty and contin-
uing gaps in achievement with the rest of the population.  
The Harvard Civil Rights Project and other scholars continue to col-
lect and publish social science studies on the effects of segregation, inte-
gration, and other actions undertaken in districts like Denver.
71
 Their 
conclusions are not definitive but are instructive. First, these studies have 
assessment problems because the rapid reconstitution of racially isolated 
neighborhoods makes it hard to identify the benefits of more racial bal-
ance. Second, socioeconomic background may drive some findings of 
studies in highly concentrated areas of poverty for blacks and Latinos. 
But Denver-specific studies have found statistically significant im-
provement in learning and other well-being-related outcomes for both 
  
§§ 3311–3318 (1978) (repealed 1982)); Charles J. Russo, Unequal Educational Opportunities for 
Gifted Students: Robbing Peter to Pay Paul?, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 727, 731–32 (2001) (explain-
ing that even though data is not tracked consistently, racial minority families are in greater need of 
programming for gifted students than are their middle-income peers). 
 68. See Orfield, supra note 67, at 4–5 (describing how “[t]he country turned in a different 
direction when the standards movement emerged in the aftermath of the Reagan administration’s A 
Nation at Risk report in 1983,” and it began overlooking the social contexts of schools such as 
“problems of racial and economic inequality and the positive possibilities of racial diversity”). 
 69. BELL, supra note 48, at 114. 
 70. See, e.g., Lisa Martinez, Assoc. Professor, Dep’t of Sociology & Criminology, Univ. of 
Denver, Remarks on Panel 3: De Facto Segregation and the Neighborhoods and Communities in 
Which Children Are Raised at Denver University Law Review Symposium: Forty Years Since 
Keyes v. School District No. 1: Equality of Educational Opportunity and the Legal Construction of 
Modern Metropolitan America (Feb. 1, 2013), available at 
http://mediaserv.law.du.edu/flashvideo/specialevents/2013-Law-Review-Symposium/2013-Law-
Review-Symposium.htm. 
 71. See, e.g., HORN & KURLAENDER, supra note 57, at 7–9. 
File: Issue5_Haddon_FINAL_ToDarby_100813 Created on:  10/8/2013 9:54:00 PM Last Printed: 10/8/2013 9:55:00 PM 
1262 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:5 
blacks and Latinos. These studies show little if any evidence that whites 
benefit from what are once again predominantly white environments.
72
  
In 2006, the Harvard Civil Rights Project studied the legal and de-
mographic shifts that took place in DPS over the decade following the 
court’s decision that a unitary system had been achieved.73 Some studies 
found significant differences in academic achievement as measured by 
test scores for black students as compared with earlier studies when these 
students moved from segregated to desegregated settings with white stu-
dents.
74
 However, the magnitude, persistence, and conditions under 
which the benefits exist are debated in the research.
75
 Moreover, deseg-
regation may affect higher achieving blacks differently than lower per-
formers because studies also suggest that desegregated schooling is asso-
ciated with attainment of modestly higher educational and occupational 
aspirations for black students.
76
 The conditions that seem to matter are 
educational and career options available in racially mixed environments 
where there are likely more developed social networks that reflect mid-
dle-class norms of success. Also, for a host of reasons, including dispar-
ate school financing, segregated schools often have comparatively fewer 
resources such as quality teachers, counselors, and other educational 
advantages available to them, leading to fewer opportunities to achieve 
in racially isolated communities.
77
 
Importantly, some studies also recognize “attitudinal and civic out-
comes that can occur [in students] as a result of attending diverse 
schools,” including a higher comfort level with other racial groups, an 
increased sense of civic engagement, and a greater desire to live and 
work in multiracial settings as compared with students in segregated en-
vironments.
78
 White students in desegregated schools also exhibit more 
racial tolerance and less apprehension about interacting with black peers 
over time than do those attending schools in segregated environments.
79
 
There is also a greater likelihood of cross-racial interactions and friend-
ships beyond school borders.
80
 Similar findings have been reported for 
Latinos, though there are fewer studies that document the benefits for 
this group.
81
 Because Latinos are frequently segregated in some of the 
  
 72. See id. at 23. 
 73. See generally id. 
 74. See id. at 4. 
 75. See id. at 23. 
 76. See id. at 4. 
 77. Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, When Are Racial Disparities in Education the Result of Racial 
Discrimination? A Social Science Perspective, 105 TCHRS. C. REC. 1052, 1061 (2003) (“Given the 
system of public school financing, which depends largely on property taxes, and in view of the racial 
segregation in public and private housing markets, it is not surprising to find racial (and class) dif-
ferences in school financial resources and in the opportunities to learn that they purchase.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 78. HORN & KURLAENDER, supra note 57, at 5. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
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poorest schools with sparse resources, the potential increase in achieve-
ments may be a consequence of better educational resources and expo-
sure to diverse socioeconomic and career aspirations. 
Despite these findings, some of the participants of this symposium 
have questioned the role of courts in addressing the deeply dividing so-
cial and legal issues that confronted the Denver community. But the 
problems that were the focus of litigation in Keyes remain with us; and if 
anything, the complexities of the controversies have deepened. Even as 
we differ about whether and when courts have a role in resolving such 
socially important and complex disputes, it is critical for each of us to 
remind ourselves of the moral courage and commitment that these com-
munity leaders displayed in their efforts to integrate schools. Their objec-
tive was to offer brown and black children equal respect and better op-
portunities to prosper in life with a sound education. The factors that 
contribute to better outcomes and civic engagement should not be dis-
counted, and I argue that there remain opportunities for courts—state and 
federal—to be part of the discourse about how better to address persis-
tent inequality. Case accounts of the complex problem of race relations 
can lay the framework for challenging the status quo. They also can pro-
vide historical context for considering new equality-promoting alterna-
tives. Re-examining cases like Keyes does expose the intractability of the 
social problem of race relations, but our new reading can also invite us to 
search for better solutions informed by the past and looking to the future. 
F. Confronting the Damaging Effects of Colorblind Rhetoric in Public 
Education Cases 
In public education cases addressing racial isolation—most recently 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District 
No. 1
82—and in affirmative action cases on higher education admissions 
from Regents of the University of California v. Bakke
83
 to Fisher v. Uni-
versity of Texas at Austin,
84
 a plurality of Supreme Court Justices has 
fine-tuned colorblind rhetoric into a constitutional requirement that de-
prives both lower courts and political decision makers of the tools neces-
sary to address racial and ethnic isolation in schools. Rather than expand-
ing opportunities for student racial engagement and other integration 
policies, colorblindness now more often erects constitutional barriers to 
corrective action if race is used as a factor in decision making, thereby 
designating legitimate efforts to address segregation as unlawful. Be-
cause some integration policies have shown promise in increasing learn-
ing opportunities and creating socially important identity formation, the 
use of colorblind rhetoric to change these policies deprives children of 
equal opportunity. Their rejection leaves our society hobbled and our 
  
 82. 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
 83. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 84. 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013), vacating and remanding 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011). 
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communities less capable of understanding cultural and other differ-
ences. 
Increasingly the norm in public education experienced by children 
is that of one race or racially imbalanced classroom settings.
85
 Also, 
white students lack diversity as to race but as contrasted with the experi-
ences of black and brown children, their education is often very different 
in terms of opportunity because of wealth differentials. However, our 
cities, neighborhoods, churches, and recreational places are also segre-
gated and thus, there are few opportunities for young people to interact 
across racial and socioeconomic lines.  
Some of the panelists at this retrospective suggest that the lesson of 
Keyes is that courts are ill-equipped to address these substantial social 
problems of racial isolation and institutional inequality. However, it can 
be argued to the contrary. I find meaning in the dissents of cases like 
Parents Involved that challenge the conflation of colorblindness and 
equality and seek opportunities where we can rethink the policies pro-
moting integration if not today, then in the future. We can draw more 
heavily on social science literature, which more accurately today than in 
the past informs us of the benefits of pluralistic communities and the 
value of social interaction among diverse community members. Research 
findings also now document that unconscious or implicit bias shapes our 
thinking and colors our decision making about others
86
 that gets shaped 
by racial isolation. These are important tools available for informing our 
understanding of persistent racial discrimination and providing opportu-
nities for change as we reframe the discussion about the role of courts in 
the future. 
One could argue that social science findings and conclusions about 
the effects of segregation on individuals—including injuries that might 
flow from de facto segregations—should lead to the conclusion that ad-
dressing effects of racial isolation is a compelling interest that justifies 
  
 85. See BELL, supra note 48, at 109–10; GARY ORFIELD, SCHOOLS MORE SEPARATE: 
CONSEQUENCES OF A DECADE OF RESEGREGATION 2 (2001); GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN E. EATON, 
DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 274–75 
(1996). Cf. HORN & KURLAENDER, supra note 57, at 9 (examining the effect of the end of court-
mandated desegregation and concluding that “while it is apparent that Whites were becoming more 
segregated from their peers [in] other racial groups,” many black and Latino students were attending 
more segregated schools than their white counterparts). 
 86. See generally Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1491–93 
(2005) (citing John A. Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait Con-
struct and Stereotype Activation on Action, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 230, 238–39 
(1996); Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate Poten-
tially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314, 1315–17 (2002); Frank-
lin D. Gilliam, Jr. & Shanto Iyengar, Prime Suspects: The Influence of Local Television News on the 
Viewing Public, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 560, 563–67 (2000); Margaret Shih et al., Stereotype Suscepti-
bility: Identity Salience and Shifts in Quantitative Performance, 10 PSYCHOL. SCI. 80, 80–81 (1999)) 
(discussing studies elaborating on “the ways in which race alters intrapersonal, interpersonal, and 
intergroup interactions” and involving unconscious bias and subliminal messaging). 
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broad and flexible action.
87
 This would certainly lead us to include con-
sideration of race in strategic decisions for improving education. The 
importance of addressing racial separation and remaining inequality in 
education drove at least some of the Court to permit race as a factor in 
law school admissions decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger.
88
 Ironically, 
however, even as social scientific studies offer more convincing evidence 
of the need to examine the impact of racial and ethnic isolation, the Su-
preme Court’s rhetoric of colorblindness has become more pronounced.89 
This has led critics like Stephanie Wildman to call for a renewed con-
sciousness of the impact of race that she terms “color insight” to 
acknowledge the role of implicit bias or privilege.
90
 
A clear, colorblind-based objection to race-conscious efforts to ad-
dress inequality was put forth by the Parents Involved plurality. In this 
5–4 decision from 2006, the Supreme Court struck down two districts’ 
efforts to create diverse public schools using race in narrowly confined 
circumstances.
91
 The plurality view cast in constitutional question race-
based desegregation decisions.
92
 The decision prompted vigorous dis-
sents, including one offered by Justice Breyer. In a passionate and well-
documented account of the school district’s efforts to achieve balance, 
Justice Breyer characterized the Court plurality’s adherence to color-
blindness as formalistic and not faithful to Brown: “real-world efforts to 
substitute racially diverse for racially segregated schools (however 
caused) are complex, to the point where the Constitution cannot plausi-
bly be interpreted to rule out categorically all local efforts to use means 
that are ‘conscious’ of the race of individuals.”93 The plurality’s vision of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause seems shrunken 
and at odds with important and challenging issues that school desegrega-
tion cases like Keyes were intended to address. Another observation from 
Justice Breyer in Parents Involved evokes a passage in Brown as Justice 
  
 87. See James E. Ryan, The Limited Influence of Social Science Evidence in Modern Deseg-
regation Cases, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1659, 1688, 1702 (2003) (asserting that social science research “is 
directly relevant to the issue of whether student-body diversity or overcoming de facto segregation is 
a compelling interest” and concluding that “[b]y working together to present sound legal theories 
and a strong political case for racial and socioeconomic integration, lawyers and social scientists 
may yet be able to prevent our schools from becoming even more racially and socioeconomically 
segregated than they are today”). 
 88. 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003). 
 89. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 passim (2009); Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. 
No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 passim (2009). 
 90. Armstrong & Wildman, supra note 5, at 649 (“Color insight would encourage noticing 
race in each context in which it arises, including the operation of white privilege and any other 
advantaging or disadvantaging function of race.”). 
 91. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 710–11 (2007). 
 92. See id. at 748 (“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminat-
ing on the basis of race.”); Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Constitutional Future of Race-Neutral 
Efforts to Achieve Diversity and Avoid Racial Isolation in Elementary and Secondary Schools, 50 
B.C. L. REV. 277, 285 (2009) (“Parents Involved virtually closes the door on the use of the race of 
individual students to make student assignments to schools.”). 
 93. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 806 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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Breyer laments the unwillingness of the plurality to support efforts to 
address the reality of demonstrative imbalance in the district
94: “To sepa-
rate [children in grade and high schools] from others of similar age and 
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiori-
ty as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and 
minds in a way unlikely to be undone.”95 
For three decades after Brown, the Supreme Court conferred lower 
courts with broad enforcement powers and discretion in the choice of 
tools to integrate previously segregated schools.
96
 This happened first in 
the South and later in the North and West in cases like Keyes, where dis-
criminatory intent could be inferred from the previous and continuing 
conduct of local school boards and other public officials.
97
 During this 
time, in the face of recalcitrance, white flight, resegregation, and general 
malaise, school districts were required by court decree—but also often 
encouraged and permitted by courts through their continuing mandate to 
desegregate—to use broad tools to achieve the equality promised by 
Brown.
98
 
But the climate has changed, and the pursuit of equality for people 
of color has become less urgent to others. Perhaps the growing size and 
visibility of a black and brown educated middle class has been a factor.
99
 
  
 94. Id. at 803 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). 
 95. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. 
 96. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (“School 
authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to formulate and implement educational 
policy and might well conclude, for example, that in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic 
society each school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting the propor-
tion for the district as a whole. To do this as an educational policy is within the broad discretionary 
powers of school authorities; absent a finding of a constitutional violation, however, that would not 
be within the authority of a federal court. As with any equity case, the nature of the violation deter-
mines the scope of the remedy. In default by the school authorities of their obligation to proffer 
acceptable remedies, a district court has broad power to fashion a remedy that will assure a unitary 
school system.”). 
 97. Joel B. Teitelbaum, Comment, Issues in School Desegregation: The Dissolution of a Well-
Intentioned Mandate, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 347, 356 (1995) (“Keyes v. School District 1 was the first in 
a line of northern-based cases in which the Court attempted to lay down rules dealing with the de 
jure/de facto distinction. The Court in Keyes emphasized that the differentiating factor between the 
two is the ‘purpose or intent to segregate.’ . . . In Milliken v. Bradley, the Court addressed the ques-
tion of whether a federally-ordered desegregation remedy could include suburban school districts 
when a city’s school district is shown to be officially segregated. The Court held that such a remedy 
is impermissible.” (quoting Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973))). 
 98. See generally Robert L. Carter, Public School Desegregation: A Contemporary Analysis, 
37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 885, 889–90 (1993) (characterizing Brown as crucial to advancing the goal of 
equal opportunity while still leaving room for discretion, leading to subsequent judicial intervention 
in the decades to follow). 
 99. See supra text accompanying note 66; see also EBONI M. ZAMANI-GALLAHER ET AL., THE 
CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ON CAMPUS: CONCEPTS OF EQUITY, CONSIDERATIONS FOR 
PRACTICE 27 (2009) (explaining that “African Americans who score well on high-stakes tests may 
have become acculturated to mainstream values and culture,” generating apathy toward “Black 
ideological issues”); Mario L. Barnes et al., A Post-race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967, 1003–
04 (2010) (stating that evidence of a substantial improvement in the economic condition of some 
African Americans has been used to buttress claims that “[i]n this so-called post-race era, . . . those 
who have not achieved the American dream have failed, not because of racism, but because of a lack 
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It is clear that in the last twenty years (and certainly under the Roberts 
Court), the Fourteenth Amendment has more frequently been invoked 
successfully in support of the interests of whites.
100
 African Americans 
and other historically subordinated groups have often lost their claims 
involving school desegregation, affirmative action in secondary educa-
tion, and bias in employment, criminal law, and housing.
101
 Consistent 
with this observation, less than a decade after Grutter, the Court this 
Term appeared poised to reject the University of Texas’s effort to create 
a diverse class in Fisher.
102
 The University of Texas at Austin used race 
as one factor in creating its student body composition.
103
 It also automat-
ically admitted students in the top ten percent of state high schools, many 
of which are highly segregated.
104
 The petitioner claimed that the Texas 
program was at odds with Grutter but at oral argument backed away 
from urging the Court to overrule that case.
105
 
The Supreme Court vacated the decision by the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit that upheld summary judgment favoring the 
  
of skill, inadequate motivation, and intergenerational pathologies within parts of the African-
American community”); Chinh Q. Le, Racially Integrated Education and the Role of the Federal 
Government, 88 N.C. L. REV. 725, 759 (2010) (“Even among those who may be sympathetic to the 
cause, these days there seems to be an acknowledgement that traditional school desegregation litiga-
tion is passé.”). 
 100. Erwin Chemerinsky previously underscored the historical and jurisprudential incongruity 
of this shift: 
  There is an irony in seeing the conservative majority interpret the equal protection 
clause as requiring colorblind government decision-making. These are the Justices who 
profess the need to follow the original intent behind constitutional provisions. But if any-
thing is clear about the Congress that ratified the Fourteenth Amendment it is that it did 
not believe in colorblindness as a constitutional principle. It created numerous programs, 
such as the Freedmen’s Bureau, to provide benefits based on race and it voted to segre-
gate the District of Columbia public schools. 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Turning Sharply to the Right, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 423, 429 (2007) (footnote 
omitted); see also Barnes et al., supra note 99, at 996 (“[O]ne need look no further than Chief Justice 
Roberts’s opinion in Parents Involved to imagine the day when the Court will reject race-based 
remedies in all but the most egregious intentional discrimination cases . . . . Because the Court ap-
pears hostile to expanding the use of the diversity rationale outside of higher education and because 
several sitting Justices seem to believe that almost any consideration of race by the state is harmful, 
the diversity rationale may be in serious jeopardy.” (footnote omitted)). 
 101. See Serena J. Hoy, Interpreting Equal Protection: Congress, the Court, and the Civil 
Rights Acts, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 381 passim (2000). 
 102. Lyle Denniston, Argument Recap: Will Grutter Be Reshaped?, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 10, 
2012, 3:15 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=153589 (“At the center of the discussion was the 
Court’s last major ruling on affirmative action in college admissions—Grutter v. Bollinger, in 2003. 
There was almost no one at the hearing thinking that Grutter would be flatly overruled, but Justice 
Sonia Sotomayor wondered what was on almost everybody’s mind: would it be ‘gutted’? At a mini-
mum, it seemed, it would have to be rewritten, and its central point—that a university can make 
some limited use of race until it achieves a ‘critical mass’ in a diverse student body—may well be 
cast aside. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., led a determined assault on the concept, finding it far 
too indefinite, and the idea had no fervent champions.”). 
 103. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415 (2013), vacating and remanding 
631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 104. Id. at 2416. 
 105. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 21, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) 
(No. 11-345), 2012 WL 3875237, at *21; Amy Howe, The Fisher Argument in Plain English, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 10, 2012, 4:43 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=153659. 
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university’s admissions policy.106 It remanded the case for the Fifth Cir-
cuit to determine “whether the University has offered sufficient evidence 
to prove that its admissions program is narrowly tailored to obtain the 
educational benefits of diversity.”107 In the majority decision joined by 
Justice Sotomayor, among others, and with which Justices Scalia and 
Thomas concurred, the Court held that the appellate court had failed to 
apply strict scrutiny in a sufficiently demanding fashion.
108
 
Justice Kennedy wrote that to properly apply the narrow-tailoring 
prong of strict scrutiny, a court must verify that it is “necessary” for the 
university to use race to achieve the educational benefits of diversity and 
must satisfy itself “that no workable race-neutral alternatives would pro-
duce the educational benefits of diversity.”109 Leaving for later consid-
eration a challenge to Grutter’s deference to a university’s judgment 
whether diversity is essential to its educational mission, Fisher places a 
more restrictive, heavier burden on the university to prove that its use of 
race is justified. The Roberts Court majority’s deep skepticism of diver-
sity as a constitutional objective and distaste for racial balancing as a tool 
for building equality is clearly reflected in this demanding analysis. It 
seems accurate to say that Brown’s promise has not merely remained 
unkept but has been broken as a consequence of the Court’s devotion to 
colorblindness. 
Despite rapid resegregation and the return of racial isolation in 
many neighborhood schools, there are positive and long-lasting contribu-
tions of the Keyes case that may more fully be appreciated in the future 
when litigants may once again offer socio-legal arguments to courts will-
ing to hear these claims and propose new remedies and strategies to erad-
icate the subordinating effects of racial isolation, inequality of opportuni-
ties, and concentrated poverty in our nation. If local, state, and federal 
governments are deprived of the critical tools to enable students to learn 
from, live with, and work alongside other students from different back-
grounds, the chances that we can effectively address the salience of race 
and attack other forms of bias are sorely diminished. I believe this can 
have grave consequences for our economy, security, and society. The 
desegregation and integration policies and programs employed by the 
school districts that were challenged in Parents Involved—like the poli-
cies of using race as one factor in admissions decision making in Grutter 
and those that were at issue in Keyes—are designed to provide opportu-
nities for students to come together and learn in social environments that 
challenge racial stereotypes. Such integrated educational communities 
can advance common understanding of people, including racial minori-
ties; they can show us the value of living in a pluralistic society.  
  
 106. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2421. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 2414, 2421. 
 109. Id. at 2421. 
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This kind of flexibility is not the path taken in affirmative action 
cases today because a Roberts Court plurality increasingly views such 
relief not as corrective, but rather as “racial entitlement.”110 I believe this 
construction of Fourteenth Amendment equality, favoring the white 
norm as “colorblind,”111 must be challenged. District courts should be 
left with broader discretion to use race-based tactics and strategies to 
address continued racial isolation and inequality. In light of the Supreme 
Court’s recent cases, we will need to find new constitutional and other 
strategies to enable courts to entertain claims and allow other govern-
mental decision makers like school boards to address these issues.  
Rejecting these propositions, the Roberts Court has placed a premi-
um on colorblind decision making that seems shortsighted and abstract, 
obstructing rather than building opportunities to create a civically en-
gaged community of educated citizens. It is divorced from the reality of 
living in a multicultural world and far removed from the message of in-
clusion—and humanity—in Brown and Keyes. A view of “mission ac-
complished” or of a post-racial educational system is belied by the harsh 
reality of other facts. Armed with data, scholars like those at the Keyes 
symposium and authors like Michelle Alexander in The New Jim Crow 
have marshaled these facts. They paint dramatic pictures of structural 
inequality in criminal law enforcement and education linked to the mis-
guided policy choices of the government that continue to privilege whites 
and subordinate Latinos and blacks.
112
  
A 2011 supplement to the American Council on Education’s twen-
ty-fourth Minorities in Higher Education report showed that, among ra-
cial groups, Caucasians and Asian Americans are the only ones to earn 
more degrees than in previous generations; there has been no increase 
among African Americans or Latinos.
113
 Undoubtedly, this is due in part 
to the educational disparities that Latinos and African Americans contin-
ue to encounter long before they even contemplate higher education.
114
 
  
 110. Jess Bravin, Scalia Calls Voting Act a ‘Racial Preferment,’ WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 2013, at 
A3; Spencer Overton, Justice Scalia’s Latest ‘Racial Entitlement’ Remark, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 
4, 2013, 6:11 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/spencer-overton/justice-scalias-latest-
ra_b_3103845.html. 
 111. See Vinay Harpalani, Diversity Within Racial Groups and the Constitutionality of Race-
Conscious Admissions, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 463, 535 (2012) (describing “a larger contradiction in 
America: the desire for an anti-essentialist, colorblind society without the will to tangibly address the 
rampant racial inequalities that exist in this country”). 
 112. ALEXANDER, supra note 5, at 11–12 (“Mass incarceration—not attacks on affirmative 
action or lax civil rights enforcement—is the most damaging manifestation of the backlash against 
the Civil Rights Movement. The popular narrative that emphasizes the death of slavery and Jim 
Crow and celebrates the nation’s ‘triumph over race’ with the election of Barack Obama, is danger-
ously misguided. The colorblind public consensus that prevails in America today—i.e., the wide-
spread belief that race no longer matters—has blinded us to the realities of race in our society and 
facilitated the emergence of a new caste system.”). 
 113. YOUNG M. KIM, 2011 SUPPLEMENT TO MINORITIES IN HIGHER EDUCATION: TWENTY-
FOURTH STATUS REPORT 1 (2011). 
 114. See generally Daniel Kiel, An Ounce of Prevention Is Worth a Pound of Cure: Reframing 
the Debate About Law School Affirmative Action, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 791, 796 (2011) (“[Law 
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And this lack of progress reinforces stereotypes that cannot be easily 
challenged because of racial isolation and adoption of a colorblind rheto-
ric that masks bias. 
This reality is also confirmed by our experiences in our law schools. 
A collaboration between the Society of American Law Teachers and one 
of Columbia University School of Law’s clinics revealed an especially 
concerning trend in law school admissions from 1993 to 2010: though 
the undergraduate grade point averages and Law School Admission Test 
scores of African American and Mexican American applicants have risen 
steadily, and even though 3,000 new 1L seats have opened during this 
period, the percentages and real numbers of both groups within law 
schools have decreased dramatically.
115
 In fact, none of the 3,000 new 
seats were filled by African American or Mexican American students.
116
 
Furthermore, the shutout rates for African American and Mexican Amer-
ican applicants were higher than those for whites and Asians.
117
  
It is undeniable that Keyes, along with Rodriguez and Milliken, 
marked “the beginning of the end of an era of robust federal judicial in-
volvement to ensure that all students had access to equality of education-
al opportunity.”118 The choices that were made—including the retreat 
from identifying the roots of racial discrimination in residential decisions 
that could have been linked to governmental policies, and abandonment 
of integration as a means to address racial segregation—have conse-
quences that we must assess.  
Colorblind doctrine disables us from confronting the complex social 
problems that perpetuate the inequalities resulting from racial isolation. It 
uncouples the relationship between disparities in social and cultural capi-
tal available to children and this racial isolation. It leaves unexamined 
how implicit bias produces stereotypes about racial inequalities, and in-
fluences our behavior because race is a proxy for undesirable traits and 
can operate as stereotype threat. It leaves public education and other so-
cial institutions unaccountable for producing a trained elite as well as 
  
schools’ affirmative action] interventions are significant because they come at the highest level of 
education within a society where there are educational disparities nearly every step of the way from 
birth to law school admission.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 115. A Disturbing Trend in Law School Diversity, LAWYERING DIGITAL AGE, 
http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/salt/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2013). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. But see Nancy Chung Allred, Asian Americans and Affirmative Action: From Yellow 
Peril to Model Minority and Back Again, 14 ASIAN AM. L.J. 57, 81–82 (2007) (“The model minority 
myth has shifted considerably into something much uglier. Asian Americans have now become 
stigmatized for the very things for which they were praised. A new species of yellow peril has 
emerged. Asian Americans are still despised for occupying spots that supposedly belong to ‘real’ 
Americans, but the focus has shifted from the employment to the educational context. Because Asian 
Americans are still viewed as a threat to the invisible yet pervasive status of white privilege, the 
concept of yellow peril, while ever-present, has changed to include their perceived successes. Still 
perceived as incapable of blending in with the white majority, Asian Americans are singled out for 
working to achieve what is supposed to be the American dream.” (footnote omitted)). 
 118. Romero, supra note 38, at 1028. 
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institutional structures that are responsive to the diverse voices and needs 
of a multicultural society. Rather than promoting colorblindness as a 
constitutional imperative, I believe there are grounds for characterizing 
as fundamentally anti-democratic the consequences of this doctrine be-
cause they perpetuate racial disparities and leave unexamined continuing 
effects of racial privilege. It is inconceivable to me that such legal strate-
gies will dismantle persistent and devastating racial inequalities if they 
are built on a conception of “blindness.” 
II. IS THERE OPTIMISM FOR THE FUTURE? 
I believe in the power of lawyers to strategize and develop new ar-
guments to serve justice. As legal educators, we can look to examples 
from the past. Charles Hamilton Houston’s Howard University advocacy 
project that supported the civil rights strategies and litigation efforts lead-
ing to Brown is a great example.
119
 This strategy began at the time of Jim 
Crow, when the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment equality had also 
been reduced to formalisms. During the fifty years following the Civil 
War, like the ’80s and ’90s of this last century, the collective memory 
about the meaning of equality changed.
120
 As law professors, we can 
provide our students with the tools to reclaim the conversation about 
freedom and equality and instill confidence in their ability to address 
rather than tolerate persistent racial inequality. This is why I allude to 
dissents that can often make powerful cases for marginalized interests. 
There is also inspiring work being done by social scientists who have 
joined us at this symposium focused on Keyes. Students will be the law-
yers and policy makers addressing the persistent problems revealed in 
Keyes that have been the subject of discussions today. They will have the 
opportunity to rethink old strategies (armed with dissents) and create new 
solutions.  
There is already new thinking about education as a fundamental 
human right that is recognized by other nations and that can be both pro-
vocative and instructive of our construction of equality. International 
scholars are developing interesting ways to think about integration of 
multi-interest groups in other multicultural communities, ways that are 
  
 119. See generally Genna Rae McNeil, In Tribute: Charles Hamilton Houston, 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 2167, 2070–71 (1998) (“[Charles] Houston led, advised, and collaborated with scores of Afri-
can-American lawyers in private practice as well as those African-American attorneys who were 
affiliated with the NAACP, the Legal Defense Fund, and Howard Law School. Charles Hamilton 
Houston—as the successful advocate of the duty of fair representation in Steele v. Louisville & 
Nashville Railroad Co., as the bold opponent of restrictive covenants in Hurd v. Hodge, as the archi-
tect of the litigation campaign that led from Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada to Brown v. Board of 
Education—played a principal role in defining and pacing the legal phase of the African-American 
struggle against racial oppression until his death in April 1950. In large part, this is his legacy.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 120. See DAVID W. BLIGHT, RACE AND REUNION: THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICAN MEMORY 97 
(2001). 
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linked to human rights. This work can also be connected to Brown’s de-
mocracy-based equality notions.
121
  
In our country, new ideas about constitutional connections, such as 
dignity rooted in liberty, transcends narrower liberty and equality mean-
ings and can prove fruitful for constructing a civil rights or human rights 
agenda. Equality can also be rooted in the Due Process Clause. Group-
based claims of the Equal Protection Clause, that Professor Laurence 
Tribe has termed “a legal double helix,”122 can also be used by courts to 
address issues using a conception of dignity that gives new meaning to 
liberty and equality in support of civil or human rights agendas in the 
future.
123
 The Thirteenth Amendment is another consideration because it 
is linked to Brown’s democracy focus and could support its integration 
goals. It seems obvious that the opportunity to acquire knowledge 
through higher education—and legal education, in particular—is an im-
portant part of the Constitution’s promise of citizenship.124 
In this symposium, Professor Myron Orfield has talked about the 
need for vocal integration advocates to make the case for new claims 
using available data and other evidence of inequality
125
; other panelists 
have commented on the continuing importance of building coalitions in 
multicultural communities.
126
 Universities are the ideal sites for interdis-
  
 121. European Union courts have considered claims by Roma children who have been exclud-
ed from school and have found a violation of the right to be integrated into society. In an example of 
transplanted claims, Jack Greenberg writes in Bulgaria about the integration of multicultural groups. 
See Jack Greenberg, Remarks of Jack Greenberg, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 259, 259–60 (2004). 
 122. See Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” that Dare Not 
Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1897–98 (2004) (asserting that a careful attendance to 
courts’ rulings under substantive due process reveal a narrative “in which due process and equal 
protection, far from having separate missions entailing different inquiries, are profoundly interlocked 
in a legal double helix”). 
 123. See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 749 (2011) (argu-
ing that “dignity” is a long overdue term linking liberty, and equality and that the Court has not 
abided by the distinction between liberty and equality). 
 124. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups and the Due Process 
Clause, 55 UCLA L. REV. 99, 101–02 (2007) (claiming that a review of the last century’s due pro-
cess jurisprudence reveals that anti-subordination is the driving force of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and that “the Fourteenth Amendment’s core principle [is] equal citizenship, which gives every 
citizen a right to be treated as a respected and responsible participant in community public life”). 
 125. See Myron Orfield, Dir., Inst. on Metro. Opportunity and Professor of Law, Univ. of 
Minn. Law Sch., Remarks on Panel 3: De Facto Segregation and the Neighborhoods and Communi-
ties in Which Children Are Raised at Denver University Law Review Symposium: Forty Years 
Since Keyes v. School District No. 1: Equality of Educational Opportunity and the Legal Construc-
tion of Modern Metropolitan America (Feb. 1, 2013), available at 
http://mediaserv.law.du.edu/flashvideo/specialevents/2013-Law-Review-Symposium/2013-Law-
Review-Symposium.htm. 
 126. See Rachel F. Moran, Untoward Consequences: The Ironic Legacy of Keyes v. School 
District No. 1, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 1209, 1215 (2013) (noting how “blacks and Latinos had not 
forged political coalitions in support of an integrationist agenda, school reform, or municipal re-
form” as part of the Keyes litigation in Denver); Michael A. Olivas, From a “Legal Organization of 
Militants” into a “Law Firm for the Latino Community”: MALDEF and the Purposive Cases of 
Keyes, Rodriguez, and Plyler, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 1151, 1152–53 (2013) (noting how “a more 
comprehensive litigation strategy, one where the different racial and language interests could have 
been coordinated with the various parties,” might have positively influenced the outcome of Keyes 
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ciplinary discussions—like those we have undertaken at this symposi-
um—where students can become better informed, and we can continue to 
explore new policy strategies and doctrinal opportunities for addressing 
inequality that is the consequence of racial isolation. These explorations 
must not be divorced from opportunities to hear from the communities 
that are affected by our thinking. We must continue to make education 
accessible and achievable to students of color and students who come 
from less privileged backgrounds. 
III. THE IMPACT OF MRS. RACHEL B. NOEL 
I have also been asked to share recollections of my aunt, Rachel 
Noel, who was a principal architect of Resolution 1490, the “Noel Reso-
lution,” which required the superintendent of DPS to prepare a compre-
hensive integration plan for the school district.
127
 Long before the district 
court’s first disposition of Keyes in 1969, Rachel Noel—Aunt Rachel—
played an instrumental part in the evolution of the case. Like many oth-
ers in the community, she saw inequality in a public education system 
and was determined to engage in collective action to effectuate change. 
But it was her dogged persistence, enlightened perspective, and method-
ology as a social scientist that made her an especially important leader. 
As an active parent volunteer in community associations in the neighbor-
hood where her family lived, she used her training as a sociologist to 
document the disparities in the quality of education offered to her chil-
dren along with other blacks and Latinos in the city. Rachel Noel later 
worked as a consultant with the Denver Commission on Human Rela-
tions. The Commission undertook a special study of the city’s schools, 
and its report concluded that the school board’s decisions about where to 
draw attendance boundaries, new school building locations, assignment 
of minority teachers, and the use of mobile classrooms to address over-
crowding in northeast Denver contributed to racial isolation, although 
there was no official policy of segregation. 
Elected to the school board in 1965, Rachel Noel, along with other 
pro-integration allies, continuously sought board support for integration 
resolutions. She helped bring to the public’s attention a record of school 
board proceedings and inaction that obstructed integration efforts. These 
actions and decisions of the board resulted in increasing racial isolation 
of black and Latino children. For many of the Latino activists, the com-
munity goals were better education in their neighborhood schools, the 
teaching of Chicano history, and the availability of language classes. For 
blacks, the predominant interest was in attaining quality education and 
eliminating racial isolation in the schools. Rachel Noel and her allies—
  
and other desegregation cases); Romero, supra note 38, at 1051 (noting how “Keyes demonstrates 
the power of pursuing a multiracial litigation strategy where the interests of various racial groups are 
pursued along different legal paths”). 
 127. Barnes, supra note 4, at 1059. 
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Ed Benton and Monte Pascoe—listened and responded with the suit for 
the integration of schools. 
Kenneth Mack, the author of a new biography of famous black ad-
vocates, including Pauli Murray, writes about this black feminist’s lead-
ership in the first wave of the women’s movement.128 She coined the 
phrase “Jane Crow” to describe the discrimination that women faced as 
they struggled for equal rights in the twentieth-century workplace.
129
 
Though Rachel Noel evolved into an extraordinary leader in the Denver 
community, in another era she might have gone to law school and went 
on to practice or teach the law. Her brother was a lawyer, as was their 
father. And “Gra’pa”—Aunt Rachel’s grandfather and my great grandfa-
ther—also studied law by reading legal books, like others during that 
time. Rachel Noel’s son (Buddy) and niece (me) went to law school in 
the decade following the Keyes Supreme Court disposition. Instead of 
going to law school, Rachel went to Fisk University (one of the histori-
cally black colleges and universities) and studied sociology under the 
well-respected Charles Johnson, a sociologist who also mentored and 
encouraged Howard University-trained sociologist Kenneth Clark.  
Clark’s doll study was instrumental in documenting young black 
schoolchildren’s preferences for white over colored dolls. The study was 
offered as evidence in Brown of the subordinating influence of segrega-
tion, which the Brown Court movingly described as “generat[ing] a feel-
ing of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect the 
hearts and minds in a way that would unlikely be undone.”130 Although 
Clark’s study has been criticized in more recent times, the words gener-
ated in Brown about segregation affecting the hearts and minds of chil-
dren still resonate in the passionate dissent written by Justice Breyer in 
Parents Involved.
131
 
In another day, Rachel Noel might have been lead litigator in the 
Keyes litigation, as could have a host of other women volunteers in this 
extraordinary and socially important press for equality. But instead, she 
is the proud progenitor of social scientists who are engaged in sophisti-
cated and important work that supports the case for promoting integra-
tion and community building today. They have begun to help uncover 
and offer persuasive evidence of bias in so-called neutral decision mak-
ing in law and public policies and to demonstrate how race and gender 
  
 128. KENNETH MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE: THE CREATION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
LAWYER 207–33 (2012) (describing the trials of Pauli Murray). 
 129. Serena Mayeri, The Strange Career of Jane Crow: Sex Segregation and the Transfor-
mation of Anti-Discrimination Discourse, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 187, 188 n.3 (2006) (citing Pauli 
Murray & Mary Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and Title VII, 34 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 232 (1965)) (explaining that the term “Jane Crow” originated in the writings of 
lawyer and feminist Pauli Murray). 
 130. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
 131. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 775 n.22 (2007). 
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privilege affects our ability to succeed, which challenges the de facto–de 
jure distinction built upon intentionality. 
The leadership and courage of Rachel Noel, like that of others in 
this battle for equality and dignity, inspired lawyers, educators, and other 
citizens who knew her and of her work to press onward. Perhaps most 
important, knowing her and interacting with her profoundly affected 
more than a generation of college students who attended Metropolitan 
State University of Denver and schoolchildren at the Noel Middle School 
who interacted with her personally after she left the school board and 
became a professor. It was clear at the Noel school dedication that she 
had captured the imagination of the middle school students with the man-
tra “Excellence is the Standard,” which she attributed to “Gra’pa.” All of 
these children and young adults—and I daresay, an extraordinarily large 
number of adults in the Denver community, the State of Colorado, and 
beyond—have benefitted from being exposed to her leadership, generosi-
ty of spirit, and belief in human dignity. She has certainly been an im-
portant role model to many whites and people of color—and to me. 
CONCLUSION 
Ironically, since Bakke, the only compelling interest the Court has 
recognized for race-conscious affirmative action in school admissions 
has been diversity. The importance of having role models was explicitly 
set aside in that case and rejected as a compelling governmental interest 
in affirmative action cases.
132
  
But those of us who have had the privilege to interact with female 
and male role models like Rachel Noel know the value of models for all 
children. Everyone deserves the experience of interacting with someone 
who can help her to envision a stronger, future self. Even as we ponder 
how better to address the theoretical and doctrinal bases for promoting 
racial equality, there are ways we can make a tangible difference in the 
lives of youth who live in communities profoundly affected by the ine-
qualities that we have been addressing at this symposium. For example, 
we can volunteer at schools or other organizations in our local communi-
ties and provide opportunities for youths to see paths to their own suc-
cess. In this way, we can also rededicate ourselves to the promise of 
  
 132. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310 (1978) (“Hence, the purpose of 
helping certain groups whom the faculty of the Davis Medical School perceived as victims of ‘socie-
tal discrimination’ does not justify a classification that imposes disadvantages upon persons like 
respondent, who bear no responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions 
program are thought to have suffered. To hold otherwise would be to convert a remedy heretofore 
reserved for violations of legal rights into a privilege that all institutions throughout the Nation could 
grant at their pleasure to whatever groups are perceived as victims of societal discrimination.”); see 
also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986) (holding that a school board could 
not extend protections against layoffs for employees based on race or national origin in order for 
employees to serve as role models for minority schoolchildren). 
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Brown. And we can learn as much as we give from the role modeling we 
offer. 
 
